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CRIMINAL LAW - INCONCLUSIVE DNA TEST
RESULTS ADMITTED AS RELEVANT EVIDENCE
DESPITE ABSENCE OF RANDOM MATCH
PROBABILITY ANALYSIS - COMMONWEALTH V.
MA TTEI, 892 N.E.2D 826 (MASS. APP. CT. 2008)
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts's current standard for
admissibility of scientific evidence at trial is based on relevancy and
reliability.' The first successful evidentiary use of deoxyribonucleic acid
("DNA") test results in a criminal trial in the United States occurred in
1987, but the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ("SJC") did not
address the issue until 1991.2
In Commonwealth v. Mattei,3 the
Massachusetts Court of Appeals considered the admissibility of
inconclusive DNA test results in a criminal trial.4 The court improperly
I See Commonwealth v. Lanigan (Lanigan II), 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994)
(adopting standard for admissibility established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phanrs., Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993)); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (concluding "general acceptance" not
exclusive standard for admission of scientific evidence). In Lanigan H, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts ("SJC") accepted the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in
Daubert regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence. Lanigan 11,
641 N.E.2d at 1349. The
previous standard of admissibility for scientific evidence in Massachusetts courts was based
solely on the "general acceptance" standard established in Fe v. United States, 293 F. 1013,
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Lanigan 11, 641 N.E.2d at 1348. The SJC noted that under the general
acceptance standard, there was an inherent risk that reliable scientific evidence could be withheld
from the fact finder. Id. Under the standard in Lanigan H and Daubert, a party seeking to
introduce scientific evidence may either demonstrate that the scientific process has received
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community or establish that the evidence is both
relevant and reliable. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 594-95; Lanigan 11, 641 N.E.2d at 1348-49.
2 See Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 441 (Mass. 1991) (addressing admissibility
of DNA test results as issue of first impression); see also Lanigan 11,
641 N.E.2d at 1344
(validating admission of DNA test results in Massachusetts for first time). The first successful
admission of DNA test results in a criminal trial in the United States occurred in Florida. See
Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 849-51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding admission of
DNA test results based on reliability of testing process); see also 8 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D
749 Foundationfor DNA FingerprintEvidence §§ 1-2 (1990) (discussing history of DNA testing
and its use in legal proceedings).
3 892 N.E.2d 826 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008).
4 Id. at 830-31 (presenting issue before court). The SJC had previously highlighted this
issue, but did not provide a ruling because the particular issue was not before the court. See
Commonwealth v. Mathews, 882 N.E.2d 833, 845 n.15 (Mass. 2008). In contrast to Mattei, the
defendant in Mathews only challenged the adequacy of the state's evidence and investigatory
methods, but did not object to the admissibility of the inconclusive DNA test results at trial. See
id.at 841-42. Nonetheless, the SJC described the issue as one of mere relevance. Id.at 845 n.15.
This same scenario presented itself again in Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d 299, 313-14
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concluded that the inconclusive DNA test results were admissible as
relevant evidence despite the lack of a statistical probability analysis of the

likelihood that a match occurred by chance. 5
Following a jury trial, Defendant Alexander Mattei was convicted
of numerous crimes, including assault with intent to rape.6

At trial, the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts ("Commonwealth") produced evidence
of DNA samples that were recovered during the police investigation of the
crimes.7 The Commonwealth's expert testified that neither Mattei nor the
victim could be definitively identified or excluded as a source of the DNA
because some of the samples contained mixtures of DNA from more than
one person. 8 At no time did the Commonwealth's expert provide any
information of the statistical probability that either Mattei's or the victim's
DNA was a random match to the samples taken from the crime scene. 9
Despite the inconclusive test results and lack of accompanying
statistical analysis, the trial judge admitted the DNA samples and expert

(Mass. 2008) (noting Nesbitt's failure to object altered basis of judicial review, but DNA
admission held harmless).
5 See Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 831 (upholding trial judge's admission of inconclusive DNA test
results as relevant evidence). But see Lanigan II, 641 N.E.2d at 1346 (requiring statistical
probability analysis for DNA match testimony). Mattei's DNA profile matched only some alleles
from the DNA evidence found at the crime scene and therefore Mattei could not definitively be
identified as the source. Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 830. In his dissenting opinion, the Honorable
Peter J. Rubin suggested that the case should be decided on the established precedent in
Massachusetts with respect to DNA-match test results and admissibility thereof. Id. at 833
(Rubin, J., dissenting) (citing Curnin, 565 N.E.2d at 442 n.7 as governing authority).
6 Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 827 (listing Mattei's convictions). Mattei also was found guilty of
home invasion, breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, assault and battery,
indecent assault and battery on a person over fourteen years old, and assault by means of a
dangerous weapon. Id. These crimes took place inside the victim's apartment unit. Id. at 827-28
(providing details of attack).
7 Id. at 830 (describing DNA samples produced at trial). The Commonwealth produced three
articles that contained DNA: the sweatpants worn by Mattei on the day in question, the interior
doorknob on the victim's apartment door, and a blood-stained sweatshirt that was found near the
crime scene and allegedly worn by Mattei on the day the victim was attacked. Id. DNA testing
performed on the sweatshirt provided a positive match of both Mattei's and the victim's DNA.
Id. The testing and testimony of the positive match were admitted into evidence without
objection. Id. Mattei's counsel, however, objected to the DNA sample and expert testimony with
respect to the sweatpants and doorknob. Id.
8 Id. (noting some DNA evidence was inconclusive). Mattei and the victim could not be
identified or excluded as a source of the DNA on the sweatpants and doorknob, respectively. Id.
The DNA mixture on the doorknob contained alleles that matched Mattei's DNA profile and
alleles that did not match. Id. The expert also testified that the victim was a potential contributor
to some of the DNA mixture on the sweatpants. Id. at 834-35 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (discussing
expert's testimony concerning DNA mixtures found on doorknob and sweatpants).
9 Id. at 831 (majority opinion) (noting statistical analysis not provided by Commonwealth's
expert). In his dissent, Justice Rubin took exception to the expert's lack of a statistical analysis of
the probability that the DNA match occurred randomly. Id. at 835 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
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testimony into evidence over the objection of Mattei's counsel.' 0 On
appeal, Mattei argued that the inconclusive DNA test results were

inadmissible absent a statistical analysis of the likelihood of a potential
random match." The appeals court nonetheless upheld the trial judge's
admission of the inconclusive DNA test results, concluding that such
2

evidence was relevant.
Relevant evidence

is

admissible

in

the

courts

of

the

Commonwealth unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by its

prejudicial effect, it confuses the issues, or it has the potential to mislead
the jury.13 The standard for relevancy is extremely broad and trial judges
10 Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 830 (reviewing trial judge's admission of inconclusive DNA test
results and expert's testimony). In objecting to the testimony of the Commonwealth's expert,
Mattei's counsel argued that admission of the inconclusive test results would confuse the jury
because the failure to definitely exclude could be impliedly used as inculpatory evidence. Id. at
830 n.4 (quoting counselor's objection on record).
1 Id. at 830 (presenting Mattei's argument on appeal). Mattei relied on Lanigan II, 641
N.E.2d 1342, 1346 (Mass. 1994) as precedent for this argument. Id. In addition to the admission
of inconclusive DNA evidence, Mattei appealed issues concerning hearsay, improper limitation
on the cross-examination of a witness, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id at 829, 831
(detailing other issues addressed by the appeals court).
12 Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 831 (finding no error in trial judge's admission of inconclusive
DNA test results). The majority briefly addressed Mattei's statistical analysis argument in a
footnote, but did not provide an in-depth analysis of the argument. Id. at 831 n.6. Justice Rubin
dissented on the grounds that the lack of a statistical probability analysis of a DNA match
occurring by chance should have been fatal to the admissibility of the inconclusive DNA
evidence. Id. at 835-36 (Rubin, J., dissenting). On January 29, 2009, the SJC allowed Mattei's
application for further appellate review. Commonwealth v. Mattei, 892 N.E.2d 826 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2008), appealgranted,901 N.E.2d 137 (Mass. Jan. 29, 2009) (No. SJC-10390), available at
http://www.ma-appellatecourts.org/displaydocket.php?dno=FAR-17433. As of this publication,
the SJC has not yet heard oral arguments on this matter. Commonwealth v. Mattei, No. SJC10390 (Mass. Feb. 10, 2009).
13 See MASS. G. EVID. §§ 402, 403 (2008-2009) (providing guidelines for judges in
determining admissibility of relevant evidence). Evidence is relevant if it "sheds light" upon or
has a "rational tendency" to prove or disprove a fact that is material to an issue in the case, or it
makes an inference in the case more probable than it would be if that evidence was not admitted.
See Commonwealth v. Fayerweather, 546 N.E.2d 345, 347 (Mass. 1989); MASS. G. EVID. § 401
(2008-2009) (defining relevant evidence); 19 HON. WILLIAM G. YOUNG ET AL., EVIDENCE §

401.1, at 158-59 (Massachusetts Practice Series, 2d ed. 1998) (discussing relevancy standard for
evidence). Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. MASS. G. Ev1D. § 402 (2008-2009).
Nevertheless, relevant evidence may be excluded if its admission will have a prejudicial effect on
the jury's emotions thereby creating an unfair advantage for the proponent of the evidence. See
YOUNG ET AL., supra, § 403.1, at 189-90 (explaining grounds for exclusion of otherwise relevant
evidence): see also I BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 4:13, at 325 (15th ed. 1997) (stating relevant evidence must be "unfairly" prejudicial
to be excluded). Presumably, all relevant evidence is "prejudicial," therefore exclusion occurs
only when the probative value of the evidence is substantiallv outweighed by its unfair prejudicial
effect, such as by evoking strong emotion or over-reaction by the fact finder. See BERGMAN &
HOLLANDER, supra, § 4:13, at 324-25. All objections to exclude otherwise relevant evidence
require balancing the probative value of the evidence against the basis for the objection. Id. §
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are afforded substantial discretion in their rulings. 14 Undoubtedly, DNA

test results are relevant evidence in criminal cases, but courts historically
restricted their admissibility on other grounds.1 5 In addition to relevancy, a
trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of DNA test results is based on the
reliability of the underlying testing process.' 6 The intricate nature of DNA
profiles allows the proponent of DNA evidence to call an expert witness to
testify at trial to assist the trier of fact in interpreting DNA test results."7
In 1994, the SJC established the valid admission of expert
4:11, at 322.
14 See Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 810 N.E.2d 1201, 1210 (Mass. 2004) (noting relevancy
threshold easily met); YOUNG ET AL., supra note 13, § 401.1, at 159-60 (discussing broad concept
of relevancy); see also Commonwealth v. Mathews, 882 N.E.2d 833, 844 n.15 (Mass. 2008)
(stating trial judge has substantial discretion on determination of relevancy). On appellate review,
a trial judge's determination of the relevancy of evidence is accorded substantial deference and
will be upheld unless "palpably" erroneous. Id (articulating standard of appellate review);
Arrovo, 810 N.E.2d at 1210 (noting exclusion permissible when prejudicial effect outweighs
probative value).
15 See, e.g., Lanigan 11, 641 N.E.2d at 1344 (validating admission of underlying testing
process and expert's statistical probability analysis); Commonwealth v. Lanigan (Lanigan 1), 596
N.E.2d 311, 314-17 (Mass. 1992) (implying statistical analysis relevant, but denying admission
thereof because testing process not generally accepted); Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d
440, 441-42, 445 (Mass. 1991) (finding admission of DNA evidence prejudicial error because
theory lacked general acceptance); see also Mathews, 882 N.E.2d at 843 (noting although
relevant, issue behind DNA testing in early 1990s was reliability). The SJC has since altered the
focus of admissibility from mere general acceptance to reliability of the testing process and
credibility of the testifying expert. See Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 820 N.E.2d 233, 250 (Mass.
2005); Lanigan I, 641 N.E.2d at 1349 (rejecting "general acceptance" as sole admissibility
standard). For obvious reasons, DNA test results are relevant evidence in criminal cases because
such evidence provides a significant means for identifying the source of a DNA sample found at a
crime scene. See Cumin, 565 N.E.2d at 442 (noting modem use of DNA testing in early 1990s);
54 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 381 Proof of Identification of Substance by Instrumental
Analy'sis § 19 (1999) [hereinafter Proofof Identification] (explaining judicial relevance of DNA
evidence).
16 See Lanigan i, 641 N.E.2d at 1348-49 (adopting relevancy and reliability standard for
admission of scientific evidence). A trial judge's determination on the admissibility of DNA
evidence must focus on the reliability of the methodology or testing process used by the expert
and not on the conclusions reached. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
595 (1993); Lanigan 11, 641 N.E.2d at 1349. Abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard of
appellate review of a trial judge's determination on the admissibility of DNA evidence. See
Theresa Canavan's Case, 733 N.E.2d 1042, 1048-49 (Mass. 2000) (abrogating previous de novo
standard of appellate review for admissibility of scientific evidence). Once a trial judge has
admitted scientific evidence as relevant and reliable, it is the fact finder's duty to determine the
probative weight to afford such evidence. See YOUNG ET AL., supra note 13. § 702, at 471; see
also Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 843 N.E.2d 617, 633 (Mass. 2006) (stating jury determines
probative value of scientific evidence).
17 See Commonwealth v. Miranda, 809 N.E.2d 487, 495 (Mass. 2004) (stating qualified
expert testimony admissible if subject not lay knowledge and will assist fact finder); MASS. G.
EvID. § 702 (2008-2009) (allowing expert testimony if it provides meaning to "assist the trier of
fact"); see also YOUNG ET AL., supra note 13, § 702.6, at 486-89 (explaining permissible use and
purpose of expert testimony at trial in Commonwealth).
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testimony regarding the statistical probability of a "match" obtained from
DNA testing."
The SJC has repeatedly and unequivocally held that
testimony of a DNA "match" must be accompanied by a statistical analysis
of the probability of a random match.1 9 Evidence of a non-match, however,
is admissible without any statistical support. 20 The admissibility of DNA
test results as evidence in the courts of the Commonwealth is considered on
a case-by-case basis via a voir dire hearing.2 1 Employing this approach in
recent decisions, the SJC has upheld the admission of otherwise
22
Nevertheless, in
inconclusive DNA test results as relevant evidence.
See Lanigan 11, 641 N.E.2d at 1350 (establishing admission of DNA-match probability
testimony); cf Commonwealth v. Daggett, 622 N.E.2d 272, 275-76 (Mass. 1993) (upholding
erroneous admission of DNA evidence as harmless and not prejudicial). In Lanigan I, the SJC
held that the underlying testing process employed by the expert was a reliable methodology for
determining the statistical probability of a random DNA match. See Lanigan IL 641 N.E.2d at
1346, 1349-50; see also 4 DAVID. L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY §§ 30:46-47, at 183-87 (2007) (discussing wellestablished testing processes for determining random match probability). Since Lanigan 11, the
SJC has established that various DNA testing processes and statistical analyses are scientifically
reliable. See Commonwealth v. Fowler, 685 N.E.2d 746, 747-49 (Mass. 1997) (providing
synopsis of admissible DNA testing processes in Commonwealth).
I1) See, e.g., Lanigan 1I, 641 N.E.2d at 1346 (establishing statistical analysis requirement for
DNA-match testimony); Daggett, 622 N.E.2d at 275 & nn.2, 4 (opining non-numerical
expression of probability is insufficient); Lanigan 1, 596 N.E.2d at 314 (noting need for
appropriate statistical support as condition for admitting DNA match); Curnin, 565 N.E.2d at 443
n.7 (suggesting statistical analysis of random match probability as threshold for admission); see
also Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d 299, 313-14 (Mass. 2008) (noting expert's testimony
of statistical probability of DNA match); Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 820 N.E.2d 233, 253-54
(Mass. 2005) (discussing expert's use of product rule to determine probability of match occurring
by chance): Commonwealth v. Thad T., 796 N.E.2d 869, 877 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (stating
Lanigan 1I requires statistical analysis for DNA-match testimony).
20 Lanigan 1, 596 N.E.2d at 314 (quoting Curnin, 565 N.E.2d at 443 n.7); see also FAIGMAN
ET AL., supra note 18, § 30:41, at 174 & n.1 (noting negative, non-match results may be
exclusionary, but not necessarily exculpatory). When DNA taken from a crime scene is properly
collected, tested and analyzed, but does not match the DNA of a suspect, that suspect may be
excluded as a contributor to the crime scene DNA. See id. § 30:41, at 174.
21 See Commonwealth v. Mathews, 882 N.F.2d 833, 844 (Mass. 2008) (asserting
admissibility of DNA evidence determined on case-by-case basis); Curnin, 565 N.E.2d at 442
(stating admissibility of DNA test results detenmined in voir dire hearing). In the event an
objection to erroneously admitted DNA evidence is not raised on the record, the proper standard
on appellate review is whether the admission created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of
justice. See Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d at 312 (citing Mathews, 882 N.E.2d at 845 as authority for
standard of appellate review).
22 See Neshitt, 892 N.E.2d at 313-14 (upholding erroneous admission of inconclusive DNA
evidence because any potential error was harmless); Mathews, 882 N.E.2d at 845 (concluding
admission of inconclusive DNA evidence not a miscarriage of justice); Commonwealth v.
O'Laughlin, 843 N.E.2d 617, 632-33 (Mass. 2006) (holding inconclusive nature of DNA
evidence does not render it prejudicial or inadmissible); cf Commonwealth v. McNickles, 753
N.E.2d 131, 142-43 (Mass. 2001) (admitting DNA evidence not definitively identifying
defendant, but providing high likelihood of match). In AMcNickles, the SJC held that although
inconclusive DNA evidence may not definitively identify a defendant, such evidence is not
18
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order to be admissible at trial,
inconclusive DNA evidence must be
23
probative of an issue in the case.
The law in most states concerning the admissibility of DNA
statistical probability evidence is in unison with that of the
Commonwealth.24
In contrast, some jurisdictions, under particular
circumstances, permit an expert to testify to a DNA match without
providing a numerical statistical analysis of the probability that the match
occurred randomly.25 The admission of both qualitative and quantitative

consequently rendered unreliable, irrelevant or inadmissible. McNickles, 753 N.E.2d at 143
(noting general admissibility of physical descriptive traits not unique to a defendant). The DNA
evidence in MeNickles was offered as mere general descriptive information of the perpetrator and
not presented as a "match." Id. at 138. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth's expert used a
"likelihood ratio" to determine the statistical probability that McNickles contributed to the DNA
sample. Id. Approximately seven years later, the SJC again called attention to the admissibility
of inconclusive DNA evidence, but did not provide a definitive ruling on the issue of a statistical
analysis requirement because the execution of such, or lack thereof, was never challenged. See
Mathews, 882 N.E.2d at 839-45 (demonstrating statistical analysis not at issue in case).
23 See Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d at 313 (discussing inconclusive DNA evidence lacking probative
value). Inconclusive DNA evidence is not admissible if the probative value is substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect and misleading nature. See id. at 314. In Nesbitt, the
probability of a random match was one-in-one; therefore, not a single person could be excluded
as a potential match. Id.at 313-14. Although objection to the admission of the evidence was not
raised at trial, the SJC suggested that its probative value was substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. Id. The SJC, however, upheld the admission of the DNA evidence because it
did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage ofjustice. Id.
24 See, e.g., Peters v. State, 18 P.3d 1224, 1226-28 (Alaska 2001) (requiring statistical
probability analysis to interpret DNA "match" evidence); People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 731,
742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (noting DNA match meaningless without statistical information
demonstrating its significance); Armstead v. State, 673 A.2d 221, 241 (Md. 1996) (requiring
supporting statistical analysis accompany DNA match testimony); People v. Coy, 620 N.W.2d
888, 897-99 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (stating evidence of DNA match meaningless without
supporting interpretative evidence); State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159, 168-69 (Minn. 1994)
(permitting statistical probability evidence); see also Daggett, 622 N.E.2d at 275 n.2 (citing other
states' opinions confirming importance of statistical analysis); John J.Lovejoy, Recent Decisions,
65 MD. L. REV. 1085, 1094 (2006) (discussing use of statistical analysis). There may be many
reasons why a person's DNA matches a sample found at a crime, including error committed by
the lab testing the DNA or mere coincidence. See FAIGMAN ET AL., sipra note 18, § 30:42-45, at
177-83 (providing various hypotheses for why a DNA match may occur). For these reasons,
some scientists urge that DNA match evidence be accompanied by probability statistics. Id. at
178; cf State v. Best, 467 S.E.2d 45, 52-53 (N.C. 1996) (noting relevancy of a ninety-four out of
one hundred exclusion probability).
25 See State v. Boles, 933 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Ariz. 1997) (allowing "match testimony" without
statistical support when based on personal experience of random match probability); Young v.
State, 879 A.2d 44, 47-48 (Md. 2005) (permitting testimony of "match" without supporting
statistical analysis where probability of random match infinitesimal); see also State v. Hummert,
933 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Ariz. 1997) (Martone, J.,concurring) (permitting expert to testify
qualitatively regarding possibility of random match); Bloom, 516 N.W.2d at 168-69 (recognizing
qualitative analysis). Both Boles and Young involved situations where the expert was pennitted
to testify to a match that was overwhelmingly supported by the DNA analysis. Boles, 933 P.2d at
1200 (noting "significance of a match at several loci.") (emphasis added): Young, 879 A.2d at 48.
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statistical probability testimony undoubtedly creates the possibility of
unfair prejudice and misleading of the jury.
This prejudicial and
misleading effect, however, is exacerbated if DNA match evidence is
admitted without
any supporting statistical analysis of a random match
27
probability.
In Commonwealth v. Mattei,28 the Massachusetts Appeals Court
considered whether inconclusive DNA evidence is admissible in a criminal
trial without any accompanying statistical analysis of the likelihood of a
random match.29 In deciding the issue, the court drew a comparison to
blood type tests commonly used to include or exclude a defendant as a
contributor to a blood sample.3 ° Consequently, the court opined that an
inclusion/exclusion presentation for inconclusive DNA evidence is more
appropriate and beneficial to all defendants, as opposed to conditioning
admissibility on a statistical probability analysis. 3' Based on this newfound
57-58 (stating DNA test resulted in infinitesimal random match probability).
26 See Bloom, 516 N.W.2d at 164-66, 169 (cautioning against misinterpretation of statistical
probability evidence by jury). In Bloom, Justice Alan C. Page provided cautionary guidelines for
instructing juries on statistical probability evidence, including making jurors aware that: a
random probability statistic does not reflect the likelihood the defendant committed the crime;
more than one person can share a DNA profile; the random match probability statistic is the
likelihood a random person, including the defendant, matches the DNA sample at issue; a DNA
match does not necessarily mean the defendant is the source of the sample; and, the jury is
charged with evaluating the probative value to afford such evidence. Id.at 171 (Page, J.,
concurring); cf Stanley v. State, 657 S.E.2d 305, 306 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (noting parties' duty to
give jury factual evidence necessary to evaluate probative weight of evidence); Hodges v.
Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 846, 853 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (holding expert testimony of
psychological impact from statistical analysis invades jury's role).
27 See Peters, 18 P.3d at 1226-28 (discussing potential misinterpretation of DNA match
without statistical random match analysis); Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of
Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1068-72 (2006)
(hypothesizing juror over-belief in scientific evidence by affording more probative value than
deserved); Lovejoy, supra note 24, at 1090 (suggesting DNA match meaningless without
calculation of random match probability). In Peters, the court distinguished physical descriptive
traits from DNA profiles. Peters, 18 P.3d at 1227-28. Physical characteristics such as hair color,
height, and weight are readily observable, thus providing jurors with a presumption of their
frequency within the general population. Id. at 1228. In contrast, jurors do not have an innate
sense of the frequency that a particular DNA profile occurs in society because DNA cannot be
observed by the human eye. Id. But cf Commonwealth v. McNickles, 753 N.E.2d 131, 143
(Mass. 2001) (opining general descriptive infonnation, including inconclusive DNA evidence, is
routinely admissible despite trait's prevalence).
28 892 N.E.2d 826 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008).
29 Id. at 830-31 (presenting issue before court).
30 Id. at 830 n.5. The court contrasted this situation with one in which a defendant may be
excluded as a contributor to the DNA sample when no matching alleles are found. Id. The court
noted that when alleles from a defendant's DNA do not match any from the crime scene sample,
the defendant may be definitively excluded as a contributor. Id This same definitiveness,
however, is absent when the DNA test results are inconclusive. See id at 830 & n.5.
31 Id. at 83 1 nn.6-7. In essentially establishing a new standard for admitting inconclusive
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standard, the court upheld the admission of the inconclusive DNA evidence
noting that it was not presented to the jury as a "match. 32 Although the
DNA evidence could not definitively identify or exclude Mattei or the
victim as contributors, the court held that it was nevertheless admissible

33
because it provided general descriptive information about the perpetrator.

Relying on two recent SJC decisions that upheld the admission of
inconclusive DNA evidence, the court opined that the issue before it was

one of relevancy and,
therefore, afforded the trial judge's decision
34

substantial deference.
Taking exception to the failure of the Commonwealth's expert to
provide a statistical analysis, the dissenting opinion impliedly criticized the
majority's summary dismissal of nearly two decades of precedent.35 While

DNA evidence, the court stated:
Requiring statistical, or probability, evidence as a condition of the admissibility of an
allele match or a genotype match (between the sample and the defendant's exemplar)
at a single site deemed too insignificant to support a positive identification could prove
highly damaging to defendants as a class, as contrasted with the usual "consistent with"
or "could not be excluded" type of evidence.
Id.at 831 n.6 (relying on McNickles, 753 N.E.2d at 143 n.26 as authority). The only reasoning
the court provided was that such a presentation would allow the jury to focus on more serious
issues in the case, rather than fixating on mathematical probability odds. Id.at 831 n.7.
32 Id. at 831 (citing McNickles, 753 N.E.2d at 142-43). According to the court, it was not
error to allow the jury to hear that neither Mattei nor the victim could be excluded as contributors
to the DNA samples. Id. The court, however, neglected to address the fact that a "cannot be
excluded" presentation necessarily implies a "match," regardless of the strength of that match.
See id. at 835 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
33 Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 831 (stressing that general descriptive information short of a
definitive match is routinely admissible). The court relied on McNickles as authority for the
proposition that scientific evidence providing descriptive information about a perpetrator is
equivalent to physical descriptive information and is therefore admissible as relevant evidence.
Id. (citing McNickles, 753 N.E.2d at 143). The court once again compared DNA to another type
of routinely admissible evidence-discernible physical traits, such as height, hair color, eye color,
and weight. Id.
34 Id. (upholding trial judge's admission of the inconclusive DNA test results as relevant
evidence). The appeals court relied on Mathews and McNickles in reaching its opinion that the
issue before it should be determined by the relevancy standard. Id. at 831 (citing Commonwealth
v. Mathews, 882 N.E.2d 833, 844 n.15 (Mass. 2008) and McNickles, 753 N.E.2d at 143); see also
cases cited supra notes 4, 22 (discussing cases cited by majority).
15 See Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 833, 835-36 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (stating case governed by
Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440 (Mass. 1991)). In his dissent, Justice Rubin argued
that although only some alleles matched, statistical probability information regarding the match is
nevertheless required. Id. at 835-36. In criticizing the expert's inclusion/exclusion testimony and
subsequent failure to provide any understanding for said testimony, Justice Rubin remarked,
"[dloes this mean that half the people in the world could have left the DNA that was found in the
mixture? Does it mean that only one in a billion could? We have no idea." Id at 835. Justice
Rubin noted that because DNA match evidence has a potentially inflammatory effect on a juror's
judgment, Cumin requires that a jury be provided with statistical information of the likelihood
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cautioning against the indiscriminate use of inconclusive DNA evidence
without statistical support, the dissent stated that there is a substantial risk
of misinterpreting such evidence as definitively inculpatory. 6 The dissent
emphasized that the rule requiring statistical support for DNA "match"
testimony is of the utmost importance in instances where the probability of
a match is extremely low compared to cases in which DNA evidence
definitively identifies the defendant as the source. 37 Accordingly, the
dissent argued that inconclusive DNA test results are admissible only if
accompanied by a statistical analysis of the likelihood that a match
occurred by chance.38
In Commonwealth v. Mattei, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
incorrectly upheld the admission of DNA match testimony without
requiring a statistical probability analysis. 39 The rationale behind the
statistical analysis requirement is to regulate the use of DNA evidence at
40
trial and provide the trier of fact with an understanding of a DNA match.
In reaching its decision, the court neglected to adhere to nearly two decades
of established precedent and failed to provide any logical reasons for its

that the match occurred by chance. Id. at 833, 835; see also Curnin, 565 N.E.2d at 442 n.7
(requiring statistical analysis for admission of DNA match testimony).
36 Matei, 892 N.E.2d at 835 (Rubin, J., dissenting). Justice Rubin noted that this proposition
is supported by the fact that the prosecution treated the DNA evidence as definitive, stating in its
appellate brief that Mattei's DNA was found at the crime scene. Id. Justice Rubin argued that the
potential prejudicial effect DNA evidence has on a jury dictates the need for a statistical
probability analysis to accompany DNA match evidence to provide the jury with an
understanding of the significance of the match. Id.
31 Id. at 836 (citing Young v. Maryland, 879 A.2d 44, 50-54, 56 (Md. 2005)). In Young,
the
Court of Appeals of Maryland permitted an expert to provide testimony of a match without
providing a statistical analysis because the DNA evidence was so overwhelming that the
probability of the match occurring by chance was miniscule. Young, 879 A.2d at 47-48.
38 Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 835 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (relying on Curnin, 565 N.E.2d at 443
n.7). Justice Rubin argued that McNickles does not relieve a proponent of inconclusive DNA
evidence from providing a statistical analysis of the likelihood that the match occurred by chance.
See id. at 835-36. In his dissent, Justice Rubin distinguished McNickles by stating that the expert
in that case provided statistical probability testimony of how many individuals share the same
genotype of the match at issue in the case. Id. at 835-36; see also McNickles, 753 N.E.2d at 138
(noting expert's use of likelihood ratio).
39 See Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 831 (holding trial judge did not commit reversible error). In
reaching its holding, the court stated that "[ilt was not error to let the jury learn that the mixed
DNA samples ... could not be excluded as having come from the defendant or victim .
I...
Id.
The expert's testimony that neither Mattei nor the victim could be "excluded," but were both
"included" as possible sources, necessarily implied a DNA match. See id. at 830. Despite the
inference of a DNA match, the court casually dismissed the prerequisite of a statistical analysis of
a random match probability. Id. But see Lanigan 11, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1346 (Mass. 1994)
(requiring statistical analysis accompany DNA match testimony).
40 See cases cited supra note 19 (discussing established precedent regarding requirement of
statistical probability analysis); see also sources cited supra note 17 and accompanying text
(permitting expert testimony if it assists fact finder to ascertain meaning of scientific evidence).
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divergence. 41 The court's reliance on recent SJC decisions as support for

its reasoning is misplaced, as these opinions merely suggest that
inconclusive DNA test results are relevant evidence, not that such evidence
is admissible without any supporting statistical analysis.4 2 As a result, the

court misconstrued the issue before it as one of mere relevancy and failed
to consider whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed the
irrefutable and substantial unfair prejudice to Mattei.4 3 Furthermore, by
applying palpable error instead of abuse of discretion, the court failed to
apply the correct legal standard on appellate review for admission of
scientific evidence.44
41 See Lanigan 11, 641 N.E.2d at 1346 (stating DNA match evidence is meaningless without
indicating significance of match). The court failed to provide substantial reasoning as to why a
statistical analysis requirement is more harmful to defendants. See Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 831 nn.
6-7 (indicating court's sole reason behind the standard it proffered). In fact, the court barely
addressed the substance of Mattei's argument regarding a statistical probability analysis
requirement. See id. at 831. Rather, the court believed that its rudimentary inclusion/exclusion
standard would allow a jury to focus on "other serious questions." Id. at 831 n.7. This reasoning,
however, fails to recognize that the DNA samples were the most incriminating evidence produced
at trial because Mattei's DNA was not definitively linked to any articles in the victim's
apartment. See id at 834 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
42 See Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 831 (relying on McNickles, 753 N.E.2d at 143, and
Commonwealth v. Mathews, 882 N.E.2d 833, 844 n.15 (Mass. 2008), as support for holding).
The court misinterpreted the scope and rationale of these opinions because although they uphold
the admission of inconclusive DNA evidence, either a statistical analysis was performed or the
issue of a statistical analysis was not before the court. See McNickles, 753 N.E.2d at 138 (noting
statistical analysis performed); Mathews, 892 N.E.2d at 839-45 (demonstrating execution of
statistical analysis was not before the court); see also Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 835-36 (Rubin, J.,
dissenting) (distinguishing McNickles from case before appeals court).
43 See Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 834-35 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (suggesting DNA test results were
most incriminating evidence introduced against Mattei); Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d
299, 313-14 (Mass. 2008) (demonstrating high probability of random match not probative of an
issue in case); see also sources cited supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing exclusion
of relevant evidence based on substantial unfair prejudice). When an objection is raised to
otherwise relevant evidence, the court is obligated to balance the probative value of the evidence
against the reason for its exclusion. See BERGMAN & HOLLANDER, supranote 13, § 4:11, at 322.
The court, however, never performed an analysis of the probative value of the inconclusive DNA
test results versus the prejudicial effect on Mattei. See Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 830-31. The court
neglected to consider that while DNA evidence may be relevant, it is only admissible if it is
probative of an issue in the case. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing
admissibility of inconclusive DNA evidence based on probative value).
44 Compare Theresa Canavan's Case, 733 N.E.2d 1042, 1048-49 (Mass. 2000) (applying
abuse of discretion standard for scientific evidence on appellate review), with Mathews, 892
N.E.2d at 844 n. 15 (noting "palpable error" standard for appellate review of admission of relevant
evidence). Although the appeals court noted that a trial judge's ruling on relevancy is afforded
substantial deference, the court failed to consider that the trial judge deviated from the established
case law concerning the admission of DNA evidence and requirement of an accompanying
statistical analysis. See Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 831. The correct legal standard on appellate review
for admission of DNA evidence is abuse of discretion. See Canavan'sCase, 733 N.E.2d at 104849. Regardless of the applicable standard, the court should not have upheld the trial court's ruling
because a statistical analysis was never performed. See Lanigan H, 641 N.E.2d at 1346 (requiring
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By diminishing the prerequisites for admission of DNA "match"
testimony, the court's inclusion/exclusion standard carelessly broadens the
scope of admissibility of DNA evidence in criminal trials in the
Commonwealth. 4'
More importantly, the court's ruling ignores the
overwhelming significance jurors inherently place on DNA evidence,
resulting in unfair prejudice to a criminal defendant.46 Moreover, this
newfound standard unjustly burdens criminal defendants because the jury is
deprived of any means for measuring the probative value to afford
inconclusive DNA evidence. 47 The absence of a statistical analysis of the
probability that a defendant contributed to a DNA sample inhibits jurors
from determining the frequency of a particular DNA profile and the

supporting statistical analysis for admission of DNA match testimony).
4- See cases cited supra note 19 (discussing Commonwealth's requirement
of statistical
analysis for admission of DNA match evidence); see also sources cited supra note 24 (explaining
importance of supporting statistical analysis for DNA "match" evidence in other jurisdictions).
46 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing potential for unfair prejudice
from misinterpretation of DNA evidence). Jurors tend to place more faith in scientific evidence
and therefore assign it more probative value than the evidence actually merits. See Tyler, supra
note 27, at 1068-70 (examining the "CSI effect" on jurors when assigning probative value to
scientific evidence). Thus, the risk that jurors might misinterpret evidence of a DNA "match," no
matter how definitive, necessitates the requirement of a statistical probability analysis. See
Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 442 n.7 (Mass. 1991); see also sources cited supra
notes 19, 24 (discussing requirement and importance of statistical analysis for DNA match
testimony). The influence that DNA evidence has on a jury may impliedly require a defendant to
carry the initial burden of proving innocence, rather than requiring the government to prove guilt.
See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (noting potential for misinterpretation of DNA
evidence and its influence on a jury). Instead of requiring the proponent of DNA evidence to
provide statistical information establishing the validity of a match, it seemingly becomes a
defendant's burden to produce contrary evidence demonstrating why a match may have occurred
by chance regardless of the sufficiency of the match. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 18, §
30:42-45. at 177-83 (discussing scientific reasons behind DNA matches).
47 See Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 843 N.E.2d 617, 633 (Mass. 2006) (stating
jury
determines probative weight of scientific evidence); YOUNG ET AL., supra note 13, § 702, at 471
(noting jury's role to assign probative weight to relevant scientific evidence); see also sources
cited supra notes 23-24, 27 (discussing importance of statistical analysis for interpreting DNA
match evidence and assigning probative value). An inclusion/exclusion standard prevents the
defendant from ultimately protesting the admissibility of inconclusive DNA test results based on
the lack of probative value. See Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d at 313-14 (suggesting one-in-one probability
of random match not probative but prejudicial); cf State v. Best, 467 S.E.2d 45, 52-53 (N.C.
1996) (upholding as relevant and probative, expert testimony of ninety-four out of one hundred
exclusion ratio). In Mattei, neither the court nor the jury was provided with any means for
measuring the probative value of the DNA evidence at issue. See Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 831
(stating statistical support not provided by expert). The SJC has stated that in order to be
admissible at trial, inconclusive DNA evidence must be probative of an issue in the case. See
Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d at 313-14 (suggesting probative value of grossly inconclusive DNA evidence
substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect). The utter lack of a statistical analysis leaves both
the jury and court wondering what, if any, probative value inconclusive DNA evidence has with
respect to an issue in the case. See id.; see also Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 835 (Rubin, J. dissenting)
(noting Commonwealth's expert did not attempt statistical probability analysis).
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meaning of the DNA sample at issue. 4 1 In suggesting that jurors are
capable of evaluating scientific evidence like all forms of evidence, the
court failed to recognize a fundamental difference between discemable
physical characteristics and intangible scientific evidence.49 If jurors had
the capability that the appeals court impliedly suggests, then expert
testimony would not be needed to assist jurors in their evaluation of DNA
50
test results.
Adhering to precedent, the dissent recognized the prejudicial effect
DNA evidence has on a jury and provided a logical resolution. Although
courts in other jurisdictions have admitted DNA match evidence without
statistical support, the statistical probability of a random match was
miniscule
in those cases.
Assuming, arguendo, that an
inclusion/exclusion standard is beneficial to defendants as a class, a
concurrent requirement of a supporting statistical analysis is nevertheless
necessary to combat any misinterpretation or undue weight that might be
afforded to inconclusive DNA evidence.5 3 Any requirement to the contrary
fails to consider the multitude of reasons a DNA "match" may occur and
4X See Peters v. State, 18 P.3d 1224, 1227-28 (Alaska 2001) (opining frequency of DNA
profiles not innate to jurors): see also sources cited supra note 24 (identifying jurisdictions
requiring supporting statistical analysis to provide meaning to DNA match evidence). The
scientific nature of DNA profiles requires competent expert testimony to provide the jury with an
understanding of DNA evidence introduced at trial. See sources cited supra note 17 and
accompanying text (discussing use of expert testimony to provide meaning to scientific
evidence).
49 Compare Peters, 18 P.3d at 1227-28 (distinguishing familiarity with DNA profiles from
inherent knowledge of frequency of general descriptive traits), with Commonwealth v.
McNickles, 753 N.E.2d 131, 143 (Mass. 2001) (equating inconclusive DNA test results with
general descriptive evidence and suggesting both equally admissible).
The appeals court
incorrectly reasoned that an individual's DNA profile is equivalent to a physical descriptive trait
that is routinely admitted as relevant evidence. See Peters, 18 P.3d at 1227-28. Physical traits
are readily observable, thereby providing lay persons with an innate sense of the frequency of
such traits. Id. at 1228. The same, however, cannot be said for DNA profiles, which are
scientifically complex. Id.
50 See sources cited supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing permissible use of
expert testimony to explain scientific evidence to fact finder).
51 See Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 834 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
52 See cases cited supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting particular instances in which
jurisdictions have permitted "match" evidence without statistical support). This reasoning is
inapplicable to the issue before the court in Mattei because the jurisdictions that have permitted
DNA "match" testimony without accompanying analytical support have done so in cases where
the evidence is nearly conclusive of identification. See State v. Boles, 933 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Ariz.
1997), Young v. State, 879 A.2d 44, 47-48 (Md. 2005). In Mattei, neither the jury nor the court
could determine whether the probability of a random match was infinitesimal because the expert
never provided a scintilla of statistical evidence. Mattei, 892 N.E.2d at 835 (Rubin, J.,
dissenting).
53 See sources cited supra notes 24, 27 (demonstrating the need for a statistical analysis
threshold requirement).
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the established precedent in the Commonwealth.' 4 The appeals court's
current rudimentary standard has 55the potential to reintroduce unreliable,
"junk" science into the courtroom.
The issue before the Massachusetts Appeals Court in
Commonwealth v. Mattei was the admissibility of inconclusive DNA test
results in a criminal trial absent any supporting statistical probability
analysis of a random match.
In reaching its opinion, the majority
misinterpreted recent case law and failed to follow established precedent.
As a result, the appeals court has opened the door for a deluge of DNA
evidence to be deemed admissible, despite its potential lack of probative
value and substantial prejudice to a defendant. Upon reviewing this matter,
the SJC would be justified in reversing the decision of the court of appeals.
In the interim, the decision of the appeals court places certain criminal
defendants in a precarious state.
Ryan Patrick 0 'Malley

54 See cases cited suipra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing statistical
analysis
requirement in the Commonwealth); FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 18, § 30:42, at 177-83
(explaining underlying hypotheses for DNA match and need for statistical probability analysis).
See Theresa Canavan's Case, 733 N.E.2d 1042, 1053 (Mass. 2000) (Greaney, J.,
concurring) (noting objective behind reliability standard is to keep "junk" science from fact
finder): see also supra notes 1,16 and accompanying text (discussing reliability standard adopted
by SJC). The standard proffered by the appeals court turns the reliability standard established in
Lanigan 11 on its head. See Lanigan I, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1348-49 (Mass. 1994) (adopting
reliability standard established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).

